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Abstract—A low-complexity, yet secure framework is proposed
for protecting the Internet of Things (IoT) and for achieving
both authentication and secure communication. In particular,
the slight random difference among transceivers is extracted for
creating a unique radio frequency fingerprint and for ascertain-
ing the unique user identity. The wireless channel between any
two users is a perfect source of randomness and can be exploited
as cryptographic keys. This can be applied to the physical layer
of the communications protocol stack. This article reviews these
protocols and shows how they can be integrated to provide a
complete IoT security framework. We conclude by outlining the
future challenges in applying these compelling physical layer
security techniques to the IoT.
Index Terms—Internet of Things, wireless security, physical
layer security, radio frequency fingerprinting identification, key
generation
I. INTRODUCTION
Our life is being fundamentally transformed by the Inter-
net of Things (IoT), which allows ubiquitous connection of
people, machines and environments. The IoT applications are
being applied in smart cities and homes, intelligent transporta-
tion, healthcare, etc. For example, implantable medical devices
such as pacemakers, or wearables e.g., Fitbit, can provide
24/7 monitoring of our physiological conditions, promoting
a healthier life style and enabling timely medical intervention
whenever necessary. IoT applications look to make our lives
much more smart, personalized and convenient.
Most of the IoT devices are connected wirelessly as exem-
plified by Wi-Fi, IEEE 802.15.4 (ZigBee), Bluetooth, Narrow-
band IoT (NB-IoT), LoRa, and Sigfox. For any IoT systems,
data confidentiality and authenticity are paramount as many
IoT applications carry private, sensitive or confidential data.
For example, healthcare data such as heart rate from wearable
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devices is personal and therefore highly confidential and needs
to be secure.
A secure wireless communication system involves authen-
tication and secure transmission [1]. Authentication verifies
the user identity and prevents malicious users from access-
ing the network, while secure transmission protects data in-
tegrity and confidentiality using encryption schemes. Conven-
tional authentication and confidentiality schemes are mainly
cryptography-based, and are handled in different communi-
cation layers of the protocol stack. For example, LoRaWAN
authentication uses a network and an application session key
during its over-the-air-activation process. ZigBee exchanges
both network- and link-keys, while Bluetooth uses the Elliptic
Curve Diffie-Hellman (ECDH) public-private key exchange for
authentication. Regarding secure communications, legitimate
parties employ symmetric encryption such as the advanced
encryption standard (AES), which relies on a secret key shared
between them beforehand. Public key cryptography (PKC) is
the de facto key distribution protocol.
Although the cryptographic schemes have been efficient
in protecting modern communication and computer networks,
their applications in IoT have been challenged. Firstly, conven-
tional schemes are based on complex mathematical problems
and protocols. These schemes work well for devices having
powerful capabilities, such as smartphones. On the other hand,
there are a large amount of IoT devices that are of low
cost, small size, and battery-powered, such as Fitbit. These
lightweight devices may not be able to support computation-
ally complex algorithms needed to perform the complex cryp-
tography. Secondly, conventional cryptographic schemes are
computationally secure as their security is achieved when the
attacker fails to decipher the protection within a certain amount
of time. Traditional PKC is mathematically complicated and
difficult to solve, e.g., relying either on employing integer
factorization or discrete logarithm algorithms. However, it may
be compromised due to developments in quantum computing,
which has the potential to have a severe impact on public key
cryptography. Finally, conventional authentication schemes are
based on the MAC or IP addresses, which can be easily
tampered with by attackers employing malware.
Because of the limited protection, there have been increas-
ingly notorious IoT cyberattacks. The transformative revolu-
tion that IoT aims to bring about is thus compromised by
the lack of secure connectivity. All of these attacks have
compromised societal trust in the IoT services. Therefore, it is
necessary to develop new security primitives for the vulnerable
IoT applications.
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2There are emerging techniques, which exploit the unique
features and characteristics of the transceiver hardware and
wireless channels for security purposes. The received signal
r(t) can be formulated as
r(t) = Fu
[
x(t)
] ∗ h(t) + n(t), (1)
where Fu[·] is the transceiver effect imposed on user u, x(t) is
the transmitted signal, h(t) is the wireless channel, and n(t)
is the noise. Due to the imperfections of the manufacturing
process, there are subtle differences between the radio fre-
quency components of the transceivers, which will result in
slight feature variations among them. These features of each
transceiver, i.e., Fu[·], are unique and can be observed from the
electromagnetic waves that are emitted by it. This signature ex-
ploits the individual characteristics of the transceiver’s analog
circuitry and is obtained from the wireless physical layer. This
is termed radio frequency fingerprinting (RFF) and results in
a fingerprint that can be used to authenticate the individual
device’s identity. Explicitly, the process of differentiating and
measuring the fingerprints of the analog circuitry is RFF
identification [2]. The channel between any two users, i.e.,
h(t), is determined by the propagation environment, which is
also affected by the user/object movements. The random nature
of the wireless channel between users can be exploited as
common information and employed as the cryptographic key,
which is termed as key generation from wireless channels [3].
RFF identification and key generation are eminently suitable
for IoT. Firstly, neither of these two techniques is energy-
hungry, hence they can be applied for power-constrained IoT
devices. As it will be discussed later, RFF identification does
not involve complex computations at the devices; the results
in [4] demonstrate that the energy required by an ECDH
protocol, a popular PKC scheme, is 98 times higher than
that needed by key generation. In addition, RFF identification
and key generation can be implemented in the context of
a real system by exploiting the existing data transmissions,
without incurring modification to the standard procedures. RFF
identification and key generation thus have attracted much
research interest (see [2], [3] and references therein). The
authors have carried out extensive work in these areas includ-
ing RFF identification for ZigBee [5], [6], key generation for
WiFi [7], [8] and LoRa [9]. This paper firstly reviews the
RFF identification protocol. It then gives a tutorial on the
design of key generation. In particular, the key generation
implementation and performance in short-range (Wi-Fi) and
long-range (LoRa) environments is compared for the first time.
Authentication and secure transmission are usually handled
separately and independently. Based on the fact that both
RFF identification and key generation occur in the physical
layer of the communication stack, this paper goes beyond
and proposes a new and integrated security framework for
the IoT by combining these two techniques. The paper finally
concludes with visions of the future research chanllenges.
II. RADIO FREQUENCY FINGERPRINTING,
AUTHENTICATION BY HARDWARE VARIATION
Hardware variations in analog circuitry appear in individual
circuits as a result caused from the manufacturing process.
Fig. 1. RFF identification protocol
These imperfections are universal, distinctive and permanent,
and can act as the unique fingerprint for the device. These
fingerprints manifest as RFFs, extracted from the electromag-
netic waves that are generated when the devices communicate
with each other.
A. Protocol
As shown in Fig. 1, the authenticator aims to classify the
N intended users by analyzing their received signals, and
carrying out feature extraction and classification. The protocol
is explained in detail as follows.
1) Signal Part Segmenting: After receiving signals from
each user, the authenticator partitions them into segments and
then identification signals will be extracted from them. The
segments that have been applied for RFF identification include:
• Transient part: When the frequency synthesizer attempts
to lock on to the transmission frequency assigned to the
user, the authenticator will separate the turn-on transient
part, transition observed when the device is turning on,
for identification.
• Near-transient part: This part includes both the turn-on
transient and some segments of the stable signal.
• Preamble part: The power spectral density of the pream-
ble part of the signal may be computed to extract uniquely
identifiable features. Both the frequency and phase char-
acteristics of the preamble can be used to create the RFF.
• The entire signal: The frequency, phase, amplitude and
I/Q samples can all be evaluated in the entire signal to
extract the RFF features.
• RF burst: For radio-frequency identification (RFID) based
systems, the out-of-band emissions of a sinusoidal carrier
outside its intended frequency can also be utilized to
obtain a fingerprint.
2) Feature Extraction: The distinct characteristics that are
extracted from the signal segments are termed features. The
features that have been used to represent the RFF include
wavelets, FFT spectra, modulation constellation variations,
clock skew, transient length and timing errors, to name but
a few. The features are related to definitative parts of the
transmitter, such as the power amplifier, frequency synthesizer,
modulator circuitry, oscillator and the antenna.
33) Identification and Classification: The objective is to
find a function φ, which projects the feature space of N
users, V = {v1, v2, v3...vN}, to the so-called class space,
C = {c1, c2, c3....cN}, which is formulated as φ : V → C,
where the function φ belongs to a hypothesis space Φ. After
the projection, the feature of the specific user is classified to
the corresponding class. This hypothesis space can also be
mapped on to a real number IR using a so-called scoring
function, s : V ×C → IR, which returns a value corresponding
to the highest score and can be expressed as
φ(v) = argmax
c
s(v, c). (2)
When s(v, c) is translated to joint probability models,
s(v, c)→ P (v, c) becomes the foundation of the probabilistic
classifiers, e.g., naive Bayes and linear discriminant analysis.
Let us now consider an input signal received by the authen-
ticator having a feature vector vi and let the computed score
be s(vi, c). Identification is performed when the score s(vi, c)
exceeds a set threshold value, λ. By contrast, if the computed
score is below λ, then the incoming signal is deemed to be
from an unauthorized user and its authentication is refused. If
the calculated score is above λ, then φ(v) is computed and
the device identity (corresponding class) is inferred.
When the classifier is trained to map the feature space V
to the class space C, we have to measure the mapping. A loss
function L(c, cˆ) can be defined, where cˆ is the estimated class.
The expected loss of φ can be estimated by training, using a
so-called empirical risk function Remp, formulated as
Remp(φ) =
1
N
∑
i
L[ci, φ(vi)] (3)
This measure helps us to avoid over-fitting and under-fitting
scenarios while training. After the classifier is trained, the
classified features of the enrolled users are then stored in a
database. When a new incoming signal is received, its feature
is extracted and its score is computed using the features saved
in the database; this is then used for authentication.
In our previous work [6], 20 user scenarios were created,
each with two ZigBee devices. These 40 nodes were various
ZigBee sensors, such as MicaZ, Imote2 and TelosB, and a
USRP N210 connected to a PC, which was used as the au-
thenticator node. The specific feature used in the experiments
was the 512-point FFT of the baseband preamble, and 2000
samples per device were collected. The feature classification
was carried out by projecting features into a subspace using
the Fisher Linear discriminant analysis and then their Ma-
halanobis distance was measured. The classification error rate
was found to be as low as 0.47%. Fig. 2 characterizes the RFF
identification method, where 20 different users were classified
versus their Mahalanobis distance score against the number of
samples used. In the dataset used as input, 0 to 1000 · n test
samples were meant for user n, which is represented as the
X axis in the figure. For each test sample, the Mahalanobis
distance has been computed and a corresponding color has
been allocated to the point, so that the reader can match it
with its corresponding user label in the Z-axis.
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Fig. 2. ZigBee-based RFF identification
B. Applications
RFF identification has been tested on several wireless pro-
tocols that are predominantly used in IoT applications. Most
IoT networks follow a star network topology and many devices
connect to a central hub, which can act as the authenticator.
Wi-Fi uses the Wi-Fi Protected Access (WPA) scheme
for authentication which employs the temporal key integrity
protocol (TKIP) for its key exchange. Attacks like TKIP
Michael Attack and its variations have already identified severe
weaknesses in the WPA scheme, since the MAC address
in the Wi-Fi frame is easy to forge (MAC spoofing). By
contrast, the RFF of the Wi-Fi network interface cards is
difficult to forge, and can hence be employed to strengthen
network security [10]. The popular LoRaWAN protocol faces
a similar issue, since it uses a network as well as application
session key and employs the AES-128 scheme for encryption.
Because of the relatively short key length, the network can
suffer from multiple potential attacks, and hence the unique
device address may be easily spoofed. Along with the state-
of-the-art cryptographic-based authentication scheme used in
LoRa, the addition of RFF identification can reduce the
vulnerability [11]. ZigBee and Bluetooth use variants of the
Diffie-Hellman algorithm to exchange keys for authentication.
Furthermore, ZigBee uses plain text instead of a cipher text
for transmission, which allows the devices to be easily cloned,
and the network becomes vulnerable to replay attacks. RFF
identification has the potential to enhance the authentication
of ZigBee [5].
There are also applications in the context of RFID systems.
As the terminology suggests, the nature of RFID is an identifi-
cation technology, which consists of a reader and RFID tags.
Authentication can only happen in an RFID system if they
possess a micro controller both in the tag and in the reader,
which is not economically feasible given the extremely lost
cost needs of the application domains. The current authenti-
cation for RFID is achieved with the aid of microchips that
use hardwired logic, designed to perform simple authentication
and encryption. Unfortunately, even with this modification,
RFID can still be easily sniffed, after which an attacker can
carry out a replay attack and gain access. This signal replay
attack can be prevented by using RFF identification, because
the attacker can only copy the data but not the RFF itself [12].
4Fig. 3. Key generation protocol
III. WIRELESS KEY GENERATION, SECURE
COMMUNICATION BY CHANNEL RANDOMNESS
The wireless channel is intrinsic to the environment, affected
by the environment layout, scatterer distribution and materials,
as well as by the movement of users or scatterers, etc.
Therefore, the characteristics of wireless channels tend to be
unique and unpredictable. The randomness exhibited by the
wireless environment between any two users can be exploited
to generate cryptographic keys for secure communications [8].
A. Protocol
Key generation usually works in a pairwise mode between
two users, namely Alice and Bob. Without loss of generality,
Alice is selected as the initiator and Bob is a legitimate user,
who can be authorized by the RFF identification introduced
in Section II. As shown in Fig. 3, the process usually includes
four stages, namely channel probing, quantization, information
reconciliation and privacy amplification.
1) Channel Probing: The users communicate in a time
division duplex (TDD) mode at the same carrier frequency.
Bidirectional channel measurements are required for the chan-
nel probing stage. During the ith probing at time ti, Alice
sends a packet to Bob, which allows Bob to get the channel
measurement XB(ti). After time τ , Bob transmits a packet to
Alice who can obtain the channel measurement XA(ti + τ).
According to the channel reciprocity, when τ is shorter than
the coherence time, the channel is highly correlated and the
measurements obtained by Alice and Bob will be similar.
Alice and Bob repeat the above channel sampling for a certain
time to collect sufficient measurements. It is worth noting that
in key generation, users are not transmitting keys secretly,
but extract keys from the wireless channel by employing a
public pilot. No dedicated packet transmissions are required,
as the channel measurements can be carried out along with
the normal data transmission [13].
Any channel measurement parameter which can reflect the
variation is applicable for key generation. The parameters
suitable for key generation include:
• Received signal strength (RSS): RSS (received power)
is the most popular candidate because it is available in
almost all the wireless protocols, including Wi-Fi, Zig-
Bee, Bluetooth, LoRa, etc. However, RSS is the averaged
power of a packet which is coarse-grained, thus much
randomness information is lost.
• Channel state information (CSI): CSI is the channel gain
in time, frequency and spatial domains, including both
amplitude and phase, which is fine-grained. The estimated
CSI can be obtained by diverse wireless techniques. For
example, ultra-wideband systems can get the channel
impulse response, while orthogonal frequency-division
multiplexing (OFDM) and multiple-input and multiple-
output (MIMO) can obtain the channel gains in the
frequency and spatial domain, respectively. However, the
CSI is not made public in many commercial transceivers,
which limits its application in key generation.
We have carried out RSS-based key generation experiments
using Wi-Fi in an indoor office [8] and using LoRa in an
urban environment, representing short-range and long-range
environments, respectively. In both cases, the device was car-
ried by a pedestrian, moving at a walking speed, so the channel
underwent slow fading. Parts of the results are shown in
Fig. 4(a) and Fig. 4(b), respectively. A detailed comparison and
analysis will be given in Section III-B. The cross correlation
coefficients between the received power of Alice and Bob in
the Wi-Fi-based and LoRa-based key generation are 0.9646
and 0.9582, respectively, which indicate a strong reciprocity.
2) Quantization: Cryptographic applications require a bi-
nary sequence as the key, but the channel measurements,
Xu, are analog. Quantization can be adopted to convert
analog measurements, Xu, to digital ones, Ku, which can
be categorized into the absolute-value-based quantizer and
differential-value-based quantizer.
Absolute-value-based quantizer works in a similar manner
to an analog-to-digital converter. The user will first calculate
the quantization thresholds, and then assigns a binary result
when it is compared to the channel measurements. The output
of such a mean-value-based quantizer example is shown in
Fig. 4(a). Alice and Bob calculate their mean values as their
own thresholds, respectively. All the analog values above the
threshold are considered as 1, while the measurements below
the threshold are converted to 0.
Differential-value-based quantizer is completed by compar-
ing the difference between adjacent measurements. As shown
in Fig. 4(b), a 0 is assigned when Xu(i+ 1) ≤ X(i) and a 1
is assigned when Xu(i+ 1) > Xu(i).
3) Information Reconciliation and Privacy Amplification:
The channel measurements of Alice and Bob are generally not
identical because of the noise and non-simultaneous sampling,
which will result in mismatches between the quantized key
sequences, KA and KB . The percentage of the number of
errors over the key length, is defined as the key disagreement
ratio. As illustrated in Fig. 4(a), even if there is only a very
slight difference between the measurements of Alice and Bob,
it still results in a mismatch after quantization. Information
reconciliation is adopted to correct these discrepancies, which
can be achieved by employing an error correction code such
as BCH or LDPC code. Provided that the number of errors
is not excessive, Alice and Bob will then both get the same
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Fig. 4. (a) Key generation using Wi-Fi in an indoor office environment. (b) Key generation using LoRa in an urban environment.
keys, K ′. For example, a (n, k, t) BCH code can correct t out
of n errors. For example, a BCH (15, 3, 3) code can correct
20% mismatch. The KDR in Fig. 4(a) is 4.03%, which can be
corrected. Some public discussion will be required during this
stage, e.g., exchanging the syndrome, which can be heard by
the attackers as well. Finally, privacy amplification is used to
remove the information leakage by using the hash function,
which completes the key generation process.
B. Applications
Key generation has been prototyped for wireless IoT pro-
tocols and tested in various environments, demonstrating the
practicality of this promising technology. This section reviews
key generation applications based on different channel condi-
tions.
Many IoT applications are running in indoor environments,
including the smart home. For example, you may want to
control the home appliances using a smartphone by sending
the signals securely. The indoor environment is indeed ideal
for key generation. This is because firstly it has a slow fading
channel as the variation is usually introduced by the movement
of people, walking at a speed of 1-2 meter per second. This
will lead to highly correlated channel measurements because
the channel remains almost the same during the bidirectional
sampling. Secondly, there are many scatterers and reflectors
in the indoor environment, e.g., cabinets, chairs, etc, which
can create rich multipath. Multipath usually degrades the
system performance, requiring a complex receiver design.
However, it acts as a beneficial source of randomness for
key generation. Finally, indoor office usually involves short-
range communications only because of the limited space. Both
IEEE 802.15.4 (ZigBee) and Bluetooth are popular personal
area network standards, hence they are available in many
home appliances, consumer and industrial equipment. Key
generation has been demonstrated to work well with them [4],
[13], [14]. Since the first conception of the Wi-Fi-based
prototype and its experimental exploration reported in [15],
numerous key generation prototypes and experiments have
been created for Wi-Fi operating in indoor environments. We
also carried out Wi-Fi-based experiments in a dynamic indoor
office environment and the communication range was limited
to 20 meters. The received power variation in Fig. 4(a) is only
about 25 dBm because of the short-range communication. The
absolute-based quantizer, e.g., mean-based quantizer, can be
adopted.
In contrast to indoor scenarios, massive IoT applications,
e.g., smart cities, environment monitoring, will predominantly
operate in outdoor environments, which may involve long-
range transmission, e.g., in the order of km. We prototyped
a LoRa-based key generation system and carried out exper-
iments in an urban environment with a maximum distance
between users about 500 meters. As shown in Fig. 4(b),
because of the long-range environment and the effects of path
loss and shadowing in urban environment, there was a much
larger variation in the received power, namely 70 dBm, than
the 25 dBm variation in the Wi-Fi example. In this case, the
absolute-value-based quantization, such as the mean-value-
based scheme, will produce long runs of 1s and 0s, which
is not random and unsuitable for key generation, as shown
in Fig. 4(b). This can be tackled by the absolute-value-based
quantizer. To the best knowledge of the authors, it is the first
time to compare the key generation performance and design
in short-range and long-range environments.
IV. AN INTEGRATED SECURITY FRAMEWORK
As discussed in the previous two sections, RFF iden-
tification can be used for authentication. For a legitimate
user, the authorized user will then start the key generation
process and extract keys for the cryptographic scheme to
achieve secure transmission. Both RFF identification and key
generation offer numerous advantages for the IoT. Firstly, both
techniques exhibit low complexity as they do not involve the
computation of sophisticated mathematical problems, such as
factorization, and hence they are extremely suitable for the
6IoT. Secondly, both are information-theoretically secure. Both
RFF identification and key generation exploit the inherent
randomness residing in the physical world, such as the hard-
ware imperfections imposed by the manufacturing process and
the wireless channel affected by the movement of users and
objects. The randomness is intrinsic and cannot be tampered
with or predicted easily.
Since both techniques rely on the physical layer of the
wireless communications protocol stack, there is clearly a
need for an integrated security framework, which combines
the RFF identification and key generation, as shown in the
block diagram Fig. 5. As shown in (1), the hardware imper-
fections and channel effects are combined at the receiver and
generally difficult to separate. However, the channel quality is
very good and hence the receiver becomes capable of more
accurate feature extraction during the training stage. The RFF
database constructed can then be exploited to enhance the key
generation performance. After the authenticator successfully
validates the identity of the user, it will access the RFF of that
particular user stored in the database and use this information
for key generation.
This interaction can significantly improve the key generation
performance in terms of the channel reciprocity and security.
The correlation of channel measurements is impaired both
by frequency and phase offsets, resulting from the hardware
imperfections. With the aid of calibration assisted by the
reference RFF, the receiver can compensate for the non-linear
nature of the hardware imperfections and get a more accurate
channel estimate. On the other hand, key generation may suffer
from passive eavesdropping, when the attackers are in close
proximity. However, the attackers do not have access to the
reference RFF and their channel measurements will deviate
from the calibrated channel estimation of the legitimate users,
especially when the phase information is also exploited.
An application scenario is shown in Fig. 6, portraying a
smart home as an example. The smart devices, including
phone, TV and bulb, are connected to the Wi-Fi access point
(AP), which acts as the authenticator. The legitimate smart
devices are registered at the AP and can gain access to the
network; but any unregistered devices will be denied access.
The legitimate users will then carry out key generation in
collaboration with the AP and the keys generated will be used
for encryption and decryption. Note that many smart home
devices, e.g., TV and bulbs, will be fixed and stationary; but
there will always be people moving around and the channel
variation incurred is sufficient by random for key generation.
V. FUTURE VISION AND CHALLENGES
Both RFF identification and key generation have been
demonstrated to be suitable for the IoT. However, as for all
emerging techniques, there are still research challenges to be
addressed for conceiving a more mature and robust framework.
Resisting an attack is a common challenge both in RFF
identification and in key generation [3]. Because both tech-
niques rely on the received wireless signals, attackers can
perform passive eavesdropping and endeavor to extract useful
information. However, when the attackers are very close to
the legitimate users, e.g., located within one wavelength (12
cm when the carrier frequency is 2.4 GHz), they would be
easily spotted; when the distance is larger, the channel will be
uncorrelated and the attackers cannot get useful information.
Therefore, these two techniques are generally robust to passive
eavesdropping. Having said that, further research efforts are
required to identify potential security risks and to design
corresponding countermeasures.
A. RFF Identification
The RFF-based authentication should be robust to channel
effects, since they degrade the fingerprint. When building a
noise-resistant physical layer identification system, the existing
methods tend to degrade the spoofing resistance. Hence there
is a need for more robust RFF identification systems, which
can be achieved for example by basing the RFF on non-linear
features such as the power amplifier non-linearity, because
most of the channel effects are linear in nature. Furthermore,
training an RFF system and storing the parameters in a user
database requires additional resource. Hence reducing the cost
of RFF is another challenge that has to be addressed. Addition-
ally, it is seen that narrowband IoT protocols such as LoRa,
NB-IoT, etc., and ultra narrowband protocols such as Sigfox,
and Weightless-N are becoming more popular. These protocols
have a very low bandwidth and transmit their information
in energy-conserving short bursts. This results in a smaller
input vector space (compared to the number of users) in both
the time- and frequency- domains, which makes classification
more challenging. More research needs to be carried out to
identify which physical layer features would be best suited for
creating a more secure and robust RFF identification system.
Finally, the specific causes of imperfections in the devices
that generate the RFFs also have to be further investigated.
A deeper and more thorough understanding of the particular
imperfections and their causes will indeed help synthesize
fingerprints and design a more secure RFF identification
scheme.
B. Key Generation
At the time of writing, indoor environments are the most
popular investigated scenarios which exhibit promising proper-
ties for secure key generation. However, many IoT applications
may be operated in an unfriendly environment, which requires
special attention. For example, there will be lots of noise
and interference in smart manufacturing scenarios, which
may result in poor-quality channel measurements. In some
scenarios such as environmental monitoring, the environment
may remain static over a long period, where no channel
randomness is encountered. Entropy harvesting in this kind
of quasi-static environment has to be tackled.
Key generation is usually applied in the context of TDD
systems because it requires reciprocal channel measurements.
While many IoT wireless standards operate in a TDD mode,
including Wi-Fi, ZigBee, LoRa, etc., there are also others
operating in the frequency-division duplexing (FDD) mode,
e.g., NB-IoT, where channel reciprocity does not hold. Since
NB-IoT is standardized by the 3rd Generation Partnership
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Project (3GPP), it is becoming one of the dominant IoT
standards and expected to lead to a wide-spread employment.
A feasible way to design FDD-based key generation will thus
be paramount, e.g., constructing equivalent channel gains with
high correlation.
VI. CONCLUSIONS
The IoT security is of utmost importance in promoting com-
pelling IoT applications and services, given the confidential
nature of the IoT data. We have conceived a physical layer
security-based framework for authentication and secure com-
munications. Our framework offers low complexity and it is
information-theoretically secure. It circumvents the limitations
of the conventional cryptography-based schemes. In particular,
the RFF of the transceiver is employed for authenticating the
user identity and the wireless channel is exploited to generate
cryptographic keys. Their protocols and applications have also
been reviewed. Since both techniques are based on the physical
layer of the communication protocol stack, they constitute a
self-contained security framework. The article concludes with
a vision of the future and research challenges of this promising
technique.
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